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ABSTRACT 
Autonomous Ground Resupply (AGR) possesses significant potential to address 
the growing military transportation gap and alter the future of combat sustainment. An 
Army Infantry Brigade Combat Team can organically transport only 58% of assigned 
assets. To address this shortfall, among other capability gaps, the U.S. Army Combat 
Capability Development Center began researching and testing Expedient Leader Follower 
(ExLF) AGR technology during Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 and will begin field testing within 
two Army transportation companies beginning in the fourth quarter of FY2019. ExLF 
technology provides the capability to conduct a three to 10 vehicle convoy with one 
manned vehicle leading the ExLF vehicles in trace. Some key priorities outlined by U.S. 
Army Combined Arms Support Command include (1) Perform convoy operations 
autonomously and (2) assess legacy equipment against ExLF equipped convoys. The ExLF 
technology must provide tangible results across these stated objectives in order to justify 
the investment across all ground forces, including the Marine Corps. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ground transportation represents the foundation for all logistics and sustainment 
support of military operations in theater, but the Department of Defense (DoD) currently 
has a growing “transportation problem that threatens the nation’s ability to [effectively] 
project power abroad” (Van Howe, 2019). The United States Army places such a 
significant demand on tactical ground transportation capacity that an Infantry Brigade 
Combat Team (IBCT) has the capability of moving only 58% of its organic assets and 
personnel in a single movement. Budget constraints and DoD personnel caps remove any 
consequential solution that involves the scale of increases necessary to bridge such a large 
transportation capability gap. Therefore, the need for a revolutionary, yet cost effective, 
solution manifests. Autonomous ground resupply (AGR) technology represents one viable 
solution, specifically the ongoing Expedient Leader-Follower (ExLF) program. This 
technology is particularly relevant as the United States shifts focus to preparing for a total 
war conflict where this significant transportation capability gap presents an untenable 
liability.  
In 2017, U.S. defense strategy pivoted toward preparing for large-scale combat 
against a near-peer adversary. After prolonged conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the 
United States faced enemies with a limited ability to disrupt sustainment efforts, the 
prospect of conventional war with a global power has refocused military leaders on the 
preparedness of the military logistics enterprise to operate within an increasingly contested 
environment (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2019). In 2018, The Defense 
Science Board’s (DSB) Task Force on Survivable Logistics described “significant 
shortfalls” in its evaluation of logistics readiness:  
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not fought an adversary 
capable of the catastrophic disruption of military supply chains and 
deployment of personnel and materiel. As a result, the Joint Logistics 
Enterprise (JtLE) has suffered neglect and chronic underfunding relative to 
other DoD priorities. Simultaneously, the ability of strategic competitors to 
threaten the JtLE has increased as they invest in anti-access/area denial 
(A2AD) capabilities and gray zone tactics. (Defense Science Board [DSB], 
2018, p. 2) 
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The DSB report specified several key vulnerabilities within logistics operations that 
will present substantial challenges in future warfare, especially against a near-peer 
adversary. Critical shortages and readiness issues currently plaguing transportation assets 
threaten the ability of our military forces to effectively project power in a future full-scale 
conflict. The over-reliance on contractor support in recent conflicts provides additional 
evidence of a fundamental lack in organic lift capability, especially regarding a sufficient 
logistics capacity to support full-scale operations (Hunter & McCormick, 2017; Van Howe, 
2019). At the same time, the increasing range of precision-guided weapons will require an 
extended reach, as well as new strategies to protect assets, supply stocks, and forward lines 
of communication (DSB, 2018). With the expectation of contested domains, the emerging 
paradigm for future operations is that of a more efficient and technologically advanced 
combat force supported by a smaller and increasingly disaggregated logistics footprint, 
which will only intensify the need for a robust and responsive ground logistics 
transportation capability.  
One promising solution to these challenges envisions the rapid expansion of 
unmanned systems to perform warfighting and logistics functions previously conducted 
exclusively by human operators. AGR technology provides seamless integration of 
manned and unmanned systems, which will enable power projection in contested domains 
by increasing both speed and capacity while simultaneously mitigating risk exposure for 
military personnel (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2018). The DoD has largely directed its investment in 
unmanned systems with a preference toward aerial over ground platforms. In the realm of 
ground transportation, and consistent with developing a more agile combat force, 
investment has centered on ultra-light vehicles rather than the medium and heavy-lift 
platforms required to provide the bulk of sustainment support in theatre (Gordon et al., 
2015; Van Howe, 2019). Furthermore, while the DoD continues to value agility, Van Howe 
(2019) notes that the Army’s ability to carry out “mass sustainment” is still critical to 
achieving decisive action against an evenly matched adversary. Continuing 
underinvestment in these all-important AGR platforms will make it more difficult to 
sustain combat forces in a prolonged, large-scale conflict, especially against a near-peer 
adversary. Overall, balanced investment in unmanned systems across all domains will 
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better diversify operational risk and ensure sufficient logistics capacity needed to win a 
total war conflict. 
The ExLF program represents an AGR technology that currently holds promise for 
bridging the ground transportation capability gap. As a limited autonomous control system, 
ExLF installs into existing military vehicle platforms, allowing them to effectively 
maneuver in a convoy without a human operator behind the wheel. At approximately one-
fourth the cost of a new Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), ExLF provides “potentially 
paradigm-shifting [and cost effective] capability into maneuver formations” (Van Howe, 
2019). The United States would overcome its transportation problem and be better prepared 
for total war against a near-peer adversary if ExLF technology could provide significant 
improvements to logistics and sustainment support capacity. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Before moving into the details of methodology and outcomes, it is important to 
establish a foundation of terms, Army structure, and the current state of the ExLF program. 
An overview of the functions of a Brigade Combat Team and utilization of ground 
transportation assets is critical to understanding the results of this research.  
A. DEFINING AUTONOMY 
Understanding the opportunities and challenges presented by autonomy 
necessitates a common understanding of what autonomy means. Defined simply, autonomy 
is technology that enables robots to execute functions traditionally performed by humans. 
Autonomy generally includes the ability to sense and react to the environment through a 
sequence known as the perception-cognition-action information-processing loop 
(Cummings, 2017). Machine autonomy relies on artificial intelligence (AI) to perform 
tasks such as visual perception, voice recognition, or decision-making. 
Appreciating the advanced nature of an autonomous system requires distinguishing 
how much autonomy a system possesses relative to other autonomous systems. However, 
attempting to define levels of autonomy along a singular scale has only created confusion 
(NATO, 2015). Instead, the DSB recommends focusing on how autonomy supports 
specific capabilities within an autonomous system (DSB, 2016). Applying similar logic, a 
recent NATO report (2015) proposed a framework for classifying autonomous 
technologies in terms of three key attributes: 
1. The human-machine command and control (C2) relationship 
2. The type of decision being automated 
3. The sophistication of the machine decision-making 
A report from Australia’s Department of Defence neatly summarizes this NATO 
framework, which we adapted to create Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Human-Machine Command and Control Relationship. Adapted from Ivanova, 
Gallasch, and Jordans (2016). 
B. CURRENT STATE OF THE ExLF PROGRAM 
The recent development of a semi-autonomous capability under the AGR umbrella, 
known as Expedient Leader-Follower (ExLF), enables a convoy to operate with one 
manned “leader” vehicle leading a line of three to nine unmanned “follower” vehicles. 
Given the significant number of casualties suffered during ground resupply operations, the 
potential of ExLF technology to limit personnel exposure to hostile environments, while 
simultaneously expanding throughput capacity, offers a compelling reason to develop the 
technology.  
In 2017, proponents of ExLF presented a seven-year acquisition strategy to secure 
the funding necessary to integrate ExLF technology in heavy-lift tactical wheeled vehicle 
(TWV) platforms. Instead, the Army Chief of Staff rejected their plan and challenged the 
program team to get a “good enough, fast enough, cheap enough” ExLF capability into the 
hands of soldiers within 36 months (Hatfield, 2018, p. 14). To meet this intent, the ExLF 
development team proposed issuing systems based on the appliqué autonomy kit solutions 
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developed through AGR. The ExLF Directed Requirement (DR) was signed May 4, 2017, 
releasing the funding necessary to design and build prototype systems. In December 2019, 
the Army will equip the palletized load system (PLS) vehicles of two transportation 
companies with the ExLF capability in order to conduct a year-long operational evaluation 
of the technology.  
The ExLF program represents a significant advance in the development of 
autonomous technology and the way in which that technology is acquired. Innovative in 
both concept and design, ExLF capability has the potential to address key sustainment 
challenges, shape new concepts of support, and inform future modernization efforts. A 
summary of the strategic significance of ExLF follows. 
Advanced Technology: ExLF represents a key technological advancement in 
unmanned systems with the integration of a truly autonomous capability into military 
operations versus previous remote-controlled technology (drones or explosive ordinance 
disposal robots). 
Crucial Capability: By advancing the goals of the AGR program, ExLF has the 
potential to address key logistics challenges in ground mobility. Integrating autonomous 
capabilities with ground transportation will generate efficiencies throughout the 
distribution system. Fewer manned systems also lead to fewer soldiers in harm’s way. 
Key Diversifier: The investment in ExLF technology occupies a historically 
neglected niche of DoD investment as an unmanned ground vehicle technology, applied to 
a medium-lift mobility platform. Defense research and development (R&D) spending to 
develop autonomous capabilities has fallen far short of commercial investment 
(Cummings, 2017), as well as DoD investment in unmanned aerial and ultra-light robotic 
systems (Gordon et al., 2015). 
Flexible, Adaptable, and Scalable Design: Designed as an appliqué solution, ExLF 
delivers autonomous capability through the integration of modular hardware kits that can 
be adapted to multiple platforms for one-tenth of what it would cost to develop an entirely 
new vehicle (Gordon et al., 2015). The ExLF capability also applies a scalable open 
architecture that will underpin much of the planned portfolio of future unmanned systems. 
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Known as “MOSA,” this modular, open-source approach is consistent with the theme of 
interoperability, reflecting the DoD’s long-term vision for manned/unmanned teaming. 
Rapid Acquisition: The ExLF program reflects a concerted effort to bridge the 
historically long gap between the development and fielding of a critical technology. The 
relative success or failure of the ExLF program will inform not only the ExLF technology, 
but also the acquisition strategies used to accelerate its development (Hatfield, 2018; 
Goure, 2018).  
Current application and study of the ExLF system have been focused on 
autonomous ground resupply that occurs significantly behind the forward line of troops. 
The future of any autonomous ground technology will eventually hinge on the successful 
implementation within units that represent the “tip of the spear.” In the Army, that means 
Brigade Combat Teams. 
C. BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS 
Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) represent the Army’s primary unit for building and 
implementing combat power. Prior to 2004, the Army was division-centric, relying on large 
15,000 soldier formations to serve as the lowest level unit capable of deploying and 
sustaining without outside assistance. General Peter Schoomaker, the Army’s Chief of 
Staff from 2003 to 2007, led the transformation to create brigades of approximately 3,000 
soldiers that were self-sufficient and thus allowed the Army to deploy more appropriately 
sized formations based on the conflict at hand (Garamone, 2004). These brigades are 
standardized across the Army, based on the function they are expected to perform. The 
currently existing BCT formations include Infantry, Armored, and Stryker. An Infantry 
Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) serves as the basis of our analysis and is depicted in Figure 
2. Other brigade types that were created during this period of reorganization include 
combat aviation, fires, sustainment, battlefield surveillance, and maneuver enhancement 
(U.S. Army, 2015).1 
 
1 Information on how BCTs are organized and function can be found in Army Field Manual 3-96: 
Brigade Combat Team (U.S. Army, 2015). 
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Figure 2. Infantry Brigade Combat Team Organizational Chart. 
Source: U.S. Army (2015, Figure 1–1). 
D. SUSTAINMENT WITHIN A BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM 
A BCT is designed to organically carry at least three days of supply on hand. The 
Brigade Support Battalion (BSB),2 which is often co-located with the Brigade 
Headquarters, operates as the primary source of resupply for other battalions within the 
brigade. The BSB will deploy a vehicle resupply convoy and deliver the needed materiel 
when a battalion requires resupply. As with the brigade, battalions are also designed to 
maintain three days of supply3 on hand. In an ideal scenario, the supported battalion will 
consume one day of supply and immediately be resupplied with a day of supply from the 
 
2 Battalions are the unit type immediately subordinate to a brigade. They generally have between 300 
and 800 soldiers and perform a specific function within the brigade. Some battalion specialties include 
support, infantry, cavalry, field artillery, and engineer. 
3 A day of supply represents everything the unit needs to sustain itself for a 24-hour period. These 
needs may fluctuate based on the unit’s size and current mission. 
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BSB. This system translates to a goal of constantly having between two and three days of 
supply on hand at every level of the organization. 
Every BSB is equipped based on the type of BCT it supports. As an example, a 
BSB that supports an IBCT will have fewer fuel tankers than a BSB that supports an 
Armored BCT. A BSB consists of four directly managed companies4 as well as a number 
of companies delegated to directly support the other battalions in the BCT. These delegated 
companies, known as a Forward Support Company (FSC), essentially represent a smaller-
scale version of the BSB. The FSC sustains the subordinate units of the battalion to which 
it is assigned. All maneuver battalions in a BCT have their own FSC. The Heavy Expanded 
Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) represents the most common dedicated sustainment 
vehicle organic to all BSBs and FSCs, in various quantities and variants depending on the 
mission of that particular BCT. 
E. PALLETIZED LOAD SYSTEM 
The Palletized Load System (PLS), depicted in Figure 3, is a variant of Oshkosh 
Defense LLC’s HEMTT platform. HEMTT variants serve as one of the primary resupply 
distribution vehicles utilized in the Army. They are capable of delivering materiel in bulk 
quantities over rough terrain. A “pallet position” is the primary unit of measure for goods 
transported with the PLS. Each PLS has eight pallet positions and is capable of towing a 
trailer with an additional eight positions. 
 
4 An Army company is the unit type immediately subordinate to a battalion. 
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Figure 3. Palletized Load System. Source: Oshkosh Defense (2019). 
F. ARMY CAPABILITY GAPS 
The Army has identified 14 capability sets that require creation or improvement if 
it hopes to contribute to the Joint Force (Training and Doctrine Command, 2018). We refer 
to these lacking capabilities as “gaps.” ExLF has the potential to address Gap 5 and Gap 
10, which include: 
(5) Establishing precision logistics that provides a reliable, agile, and 
responsive sustainment capability necessary to support rapid power 
projection, Multi-Domain Operations, and independent maneuver from the 
Strategic Support Area to the Deep Maneuver Area. (Supported by Army 
Materiel Modernization Priorities: Future Vertical Lift, Army Network). 
(Training and Doctrine Command [2018, p. xi]) 
(10) Providing to the Joint Force Commander multi-domain formations and 
systems that can converge capabilities to attack specific vulnerabilities in 
Chinese and Russian multi-layered, mutually reinforcing military forces 
and systems. This means creating commanders and staffs who have the 
means and ability to access and employ capabilities that reside across the 
Joint Force. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-
Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical 
Lift, Soldier Lethality). (Training and Doctrine Command [2018, p. xii]) 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The Army has directed the manning and equipping of BSBs to fulfill the 
sustainment needs of the brigade and has identified a transportation shortfall of 
approximately 42%. The purpose of this simulation is to explore the potential of ExLF 
to address this shortfall reflected in Gaps 5 and 10 by effectively expanding 
transportation capacity through personnel efficiency. To do so, we built a scenario 
reflecting the steady resupply of an IBCT over 21 days and compared the logistics 
impact of BSB support with ExLF technology to a base case without ExLF. While our 
scenario is limited in complexity, the simulation and model provide a framework and 
starting point for more advanced applications and analysis.  
A. BACKGROUND  
An IBCT consists of seven battalions: three infantry battalions, one cavalry 
(reconnaissance) battalion, one field artillery battalion, one engineer battalion, and one 
brigade support battalion. The BSB is relied upon to support the mobility and endurance 
of the six other units engaged in combat operations by conducting regular resupply of 
needed supplies. Our scenario analyzes four categories of supplies: Class I (water), Class 
III (fuel), Class V (ammunition),5 and a catch-all category known as “all other” which 
includes Classes II, IV, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. We assume each supported unit is capable 
of holding three days of supply on hand and located at an equal, fixed distance away 
from the BSB. Each day supplies are consumed by the using unit, and the BSB must 
allocate its distribution assets to support the highest priority needs across the supported 
battalions. We chose to assume IBCT consumption rates that are reflective of major 
combat operations.  
In this simplified scenario, demand and supply are the two primary factors 
affecting sustainment operations. Demand refers to the rate at which each supported unit 
is consuming water, fuel, ammunition, or other materials. Supply refers to the BSB’s 
 
5 Class V is measured as a part of the “all other” category for all units with the exception of the Field 
Artillery Battalion. Field Artillery’s Class V transportation requirements were significant while the other 
units’ Class V requirements were negligible and had no material effect in the simulation.  
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distribution capacity, or the finite amount of transportation resources, personnel, and 
equipment available to resupply supported units in a timely fashion. While time and 
space are other important logistics considerations, our scenario holds these factors 
constant. Finally, combat operations are highly dynamic and often unpredictable. There 
are countless factors that can affect both the consumption of military supplies and the 
overall sustainment effort. Throughout our analysis, we make a number of key 
assumptions in order to limit the complexity of our scenario towards a manageable 
framework for comparative analysis.  
1. Supported Units Characteristics 
The supported units in our scenario are three infantry battalions, one cavalry 
(reconnaissance) battalion, one field artillery battalion, and one engineer battalion. Our 
scenario evaluates how well the BSB performs in resupplying these units with needed 
supplies.  
a. Categories of Supplies 
At the tactical level, military supplies affect a unit’s readiness and the 
commander’s options to accomplish the mission.  
The U.S. Armed Forces divide all military supplies into 10 “Classes of Supply,” 
shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Classes of Supply. Source: U.S. Army (2008b). 
 
The characteristics of the force, the operational environment, and the mission 
objectives dictate the flow and importance of each class of supply. We focused on three 
primary classes of supply that are most relevant to major combat operations, Class I, Class 
III, and Class V. Estimating the demand of these supplies is often a tactical focus of 
logistics planners as their consumption is both continuous and essential to the conduct of 
battle. However, things such as repair parts and construction materials can also be critical 
to force sustainment and may have a substantial lift requirement. We chose to incorporate 
the other classes of supply (Classes II, IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX) by including a fourth, catch-
all category of supply in our model called “All Other.”  
b. Measurement in Days of Supply 
Our primary method for measuring supported unit supply inventories is days of 
supply. Days of supply translates a store of supplies into the number of days that a given 
quantity of supplies will sustain a supported unit under specific conditions. What physically 
constitutes a day of supply (DOS) is linked to the unit size, type, and mission. One DOS 
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of food for a 500-soldier infantry battalion will be higher than one DOS of food needed to 
sustain a 300-soldier engineer battalion. However, what represents one DOS of fuel will 
be much higher for the engineers. DOS gives the commander a common unit to understand 
the supply readiness of his subordinate units. It allows for the quick understanding of the 
current status of a given unit, without requiring in-depth knowledge of what 100 gallons of 
fuel means for readiness to one battalion versus another. Unless specified for a mission, 
units deploy with three DOS on hand and expect to be resupplied with one DOS every 
subsequent day. This provides a cushion for variability of consumption as well as for the 
times when resupply is infeasible for one or two days. 
c. Demand Planning Factors 
Supply planning factors can be grouped into two general categories based on the 
underlying factors that drive consumption: population or equipment. Ammunition 
consumption rates depend on the number and type of weapons coupled with an estimated 
level of use. Similarly, fuel consumption depends on the number of fuel-consuming assets, 
the rate at which each asset consumes fuel, and how frequently or steadily these assets 
operate. Taking this underlying equipment information into account, and assuming a level 
of activity consistent with major combat operations, the CASCOM planning tools generate 
an estimate for one day of supply of Class III and Class V for all six of our supported units.  
Class I consumption is population-based and is typically measured in gallons per 
person per day. Class I consumption will also vary with the level of activity and 
environment. Logistics planners often use “minimum” and “sustaining” planning factors 
across different climate environments to capture this variation. We chose to utilize the 
“minimum” planning factor to reflect an austere environment and took the average 
consumption rate, 4.27 gallons per person per day, across all climates. We then multiplied 
this consumption rate by the population of our unit to determine their water requirement. 
We chose to estimate demand for potable water only, as non-potable water could be 
considered less essential to life support (U.S. Army, 2008a). 
To estimate consumption and transportation parameters related to our other 
classes of supply, we utilized data tools obtained from the U.S. Army Combined Arms 
Support Command (CASCOM). CASCOM is a major subordinate command of the 
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Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and is charged with the development of 
concepts, doctrine, and training in support of the Army’s sustainment mission. The 
Planning and Data Branch (PDB) of CASCOM is responsible for “collecting, 
developing, maintaining, and validating logistics planning data” (U.S. Army, Combined 
Arms Support Command, 2019). As part of this mission, the PDB has developed a 
number of online tools and calculators used to aid logistics planners. One of these tools, 
the “Quick Logistics Estimation Tool” (QLET), is an Excel-based and lighter version of 
the Army’s OPLOG Planner. It provides minimum and maximum consumption 
estimates across a range of operations. We used data consistent with “major combat 
operations” to determine requirements for Class III, V, and “All Other” categories of 
supplies. While the QLET can be used to determine transportation requirements to 
support multiple units for a specific duration of time, another tool, the “Platform 
Calculator” estimates how many pallets and specific vehicle types are needed to carry a 
given quantity of supplies.  
Using the previously mentioned resources, we created a conversion table 
depicting one DOS for each category of supply for our supported units (see Table 2). 
Converting DOS into a physical quantity of supply allows us to determine the 
transportation requirement.  
Table 2. Conversion: 1 DOS for Supported Units in Simulation 
While we tried to rely on Army planning factors and tools as much as possible to anchor 
our methods, the conversion factors we calculated are specific to our simulation. We 
relied on our expertise as logistics officers to interpret the outputs from the Army tools 
to generate reasonable, average estimates for consumption in our simplified scenario. In 
practice, these calculations of DOS might differ greatly for similar units, by more 
1 DOS in UNITS
Class I Bulk Water Class III Fuel OTHER
UNIT gallons gallons pounds pallets Pallets
INF1 2,066 1,104 145 1 17
INF2 2,066 1,104 145 1 17
INF3 2,066 1,104 145 1 17
FA 2,502 2,728 7,914 5.33 17
CAV 1,544 1,262 80 1 14
ENG 2,399 4,970 68 1 20
Class V Ammo
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precisely reflecting all the specific circumstances of the operating environment and 
mission.  
2. BSB Transportation Capacity 
Resupply operations require transportation assets and personnel trained to use 
this equipment. Distribution or “lift” capacity is used to describe the amount of supplies 
a given logistics support unit can move with all available assets and personnel. Our 
simulation assumes that the BSB has the transportation assets shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Simulation Brigade Support Battalion Distribution Assets 
Simulation BSB Distribution Assets 
Assets Number 




Fuel Racks (MFS) 5 
Unit equipment, in some cases, may be adjusted as required to meet mission 
requirements. In our scenario, we assumed that the equipment set was static over the 
course of the 21-day simulation. Maintenance requirements, discussed later, was the 
only factor affecting equipment availability.  
a. Description of Transportation Assets for Supply Classes 
The Load Handling System (LHS) is the primary logistics resupply vehicle used 
in our scenario (see Figure 4). While ExLF is currently being tested on the Palletized 
Load System, IBCTs are generally equipped with LHS vehicles in lieu of PLS vehicles. 
The LHS is an identical platform to the PLS, apart from having one fewer rear axle 
(three on a PLS, two on a LHS). This translates to the LHS having a smaller load 
capacity in regards to weight, but an identical capacity for volume.  
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Source: https://oshkoshdefense.com/vehicles/m1120a4-lhs/#overview 
Figure 4. Load Handling System 
The PLS Trailer (M1076) is a trailer designed to be pulled by any HEMTT 
variant but would be transported by an LHS (see Figure 5). A trailer can transport the 
equivalent of eight single stacked pallets. 
 
Source: https://oshkoshdefense.com/vehicles/pls-m1076-trailer/ 
Figure 5. M1076 PLS Trailer 
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The LHS Compatible Water Tank Rack (AKA “Hippo”) attaches to the back of a 
PLS, LHS, or M1076 trailer (see Figure 6). The Hippo has a capacity of 2000 gallons of 




Figure 6. Compatible Water Tank Rack 
The M978 HEMTT Fueler is the Army’s prime mover for Class III (see Figure 7). 
It has a capacity of 2,500 gallons and is also able to tow a trailer with additional fuel 
capacity provided by a Modular Fuel System (MFS).  
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Figure 7. M978 HEMTT Fueler 
The Modular Fuel System (MFS) attaches to an M1075 trailer or HEMTT LHS/
PLS and can transport 2,500 gallons of fuel (see Figure 8). It is usually paired with a 
HEMTT refueler to provide a total fuel capacity of 5,000 gallons in one platform.  
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Source: https://www.leonardodrs.com/media/6278/mfs_datasheet.pdf 
Figure 8. Modular Fuel System 
b. Platform Configurations 
These distribution assets can be arranged in different configurations to meet a 
specific support requirement—usually to transport a particular class of supply. For our 
analysis, we assume that the four most typical platform configurations are the only ones 
that can be used to resupply supported units. We refer to these four configurations by the 
category of supply they would transport (see Table 4).  






Class I is transported by an LHS with a trailer and a Hippo (2,000-gallon water 
tank) loaded either on the LHS or the trailer. We chose to assume that the additional bed 
space available would be used exclusively for transporting other Class I material (food) 
and not heavier items from our other categories of supply or an additional water tank. 
Knowing that demand for meals-ready-to-eat (MRE) would never exceed the eight pallet 
positions reserved on the Class I platform, we can assume that the entire Class I resupply 
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schedule is driven by a unit’s need for water. The Class III platform includes a HEMTT 
fueler as the prime mover, which is paired with the MFS to move a total capacity of 5,000 
gallons of fuel.6 The platform for both Class V and “All Other” categories is an LHS with 
a trailer. Safe handling of ammunition requires that certain types of ammunition cannot be 
transported with other materials. In order to keep our model simple, we chose to assume 
that Class V never shares bed space with any other class of supply, but that all types of 
Class V can be transported together. In practice, this constraint would be entirely dependent 
on the type of ammunition being transported. While some types of small arms ammunition 
can be transported with other materials (making our assumption overly conservative), other 
types of munitions must be segregated completely, and cannot even share space with other 
Class V material. Because we chose not to analyze specific ammunition types, our 
simulation does not incorporate these constraints.  
c. Personnel Requirement  
The standard requirement for vehicle operation is the use of two soldiers. One 
serves as the driver, while the second is a passenger and takes the role of “truck 
commander.” It would be exceedingly unusual for a single soldier to operate a vehicle, and 
such a step is generally taken only in emergency scenarios.  
3. Additional Assumptions 
We chose to make several additional assumptions in order to limit the complexity 
of our analysis. First, we assume that each battalion is only responsible for sustaining itself 
and will not share supplies or assets with adjacent units. We also assume that any casualties 
experienced (personnel or equipment) are immediately replaced and thus maintain a 
consistent average demand for the full duration of the simulation. In order to isolate our 
simulation to one part of the supply chain, we assume that the BSB has an infinite store of 
supplies and therefore is only constrained by available transportation capacity to deliver 
the various classes of supplies to the supported battalions organic to the IBCT.  
 
6 We assume that petroleum supply specialists operate the HEMTT Fuelers and require special 
certifications to transport hazardous materials such as Class III. Other platforms and personnel are assumed 
to lack these certifications and were not used to transport Class III within our simulation.  
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Finally, sustainment vehicles like the PLS and LHS participate in sustainment 
convoys. These convoys are accompanied by security elements using other vehicle types 
that are not represented in our model. Security vehicles can carry small amounts of 
supplies, but these amounts are minimal and would have no material impact on the results 
of our simulation. 
B. SIMULATION AND MODEL 
The overall framework for our quantitative analysis is a running “balance sheet” of 
inventory levels of each of our four supply categories at each of our six units. 
1. Flow of Supplies 
Our Excel model is organized from left to right to reflect our defined sequence of 
logistics process events. This flow is outlined in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. Logistics Process Flow 
1. Starting balance: The measurement in DOS of each category of supply at 
each supported unit.  
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2. Consumption: The simulated consumption in DOS of each category of 
supply at each supported unit. 
3. Ending Inventory: The measurement in DOS of each category of supply at 
each supported unit after consumption has occurred. A supported unit 
communicates ending inventory back to the BSB generating logistics 
requirements.  
4. Distribution Plan: The BSB aggregates and weighs the logistics 
requirements of all units based on their ending inventory. Based on that, 
the BSB decides how to best allocate transportation assets in order to 
resupply supported units.  
5. Resupply: Supported units are replenished based on the BSB’s distribution 
plan, and a new beginning balance of supplies at each unit is calculated to 
begin the following day.  
We assume that each unit can only hold three days of supply on hand, so the 
beginning balance of any category of supply cannot exceed three DOS. Three DOS is also, 
therefore, the “target” amount of supplies a using unit could and would want to carry on 
hand. The amount that current inventory is below three DOS reflects the shortage of a 
particular supply for a given unit. We also chose to assume that a resupply occurs early 
enough in the day that those supplies are available to support consumption that day and are 
therefore included in the day’s beginning balance. 
2. Simulating Consumption  
The planning factors provided by CASCOM offer us a minimum, maximum, and 
average level of consumption for each category of supply. Given these parameters, we 
chose to use triangular distributions to simulate 21 days of consumption for Class I, III, V, 
and “All Other” categories of supply through Crystal Ball software.  
3. Distribution Plan  
The central aspect of our simulation is the decision the BSB must make on how 
best to utilize its distribution assets in order to resupply supported units. We chose to 
develop a model to resolve this decision in our simulation. Integer programming (IP) is 
used to determine mathematically, an optimal outcome whose requirements (objectives and 
constraints) are represented by linear relationships. Our model deals with allocating a finite 
resource (transportation capacity) to various activities (the replenishment of specific 
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supplies to specific units) in order to best meet operational priorities (indicated by 
maximizing prioritization points).  
a. Assigning Prioritization Points 
When allocating a limited number of transportation assets across competing 
shortages, a supporting logistics unit would prioritize resupply efforts according to three 
main criticality factors that describe the urgency of the need:  
1. Ending inventory level (or “shortage”): When a unit’s current inventory 
stores fall below a certain threshold of supply, maneuver options become 
increasingly constrained.  
2. The relative importance of a supply class: While ammunition may be 
important to the conduct of combat operations, Class I provides basic life-
support that supersedes all other supply priorities. Class III is essential to 
unit mobility and therefore less important than Class I and Class V, which 
provides for self-defense. While certain parts or materials might be 
deemed critical, taken together, “All Other” will not be more important 
than Class, I, III, or V.  
3. The relative importance of the unit: In the scenario we have developed, the 
actions of the infantry units through regular resupply will likely be most 
important to the overall mission. Therefore, enabling them through regular 
resupply will be a priority. Further, any mission order will designate one 
unit the “main effort” in a particular phase of an operation, indicating that 
the actions of this unit among all others are essential to the 
accomplishment of the mission. Our main effort is “Inf 1,” whose actions 
are only slightly more important than the other two infantry battalions. 
Next, the field artillery and cavalry units are more likely to provide 
essential support to the infantry battalions and, therefore, the combat 
mission overall. Of the six units, we consider the engineer battalion the 
lowest priority during large-scale combat operations. While the 
importance of a unit to the overall mission varies greatly with 
circumstance—and would likely change over the course of an entire 
operation—we chose to hold these relative priorities constant for the 
duration of our 21-day simulation. This is reasonable to assume in practice 
over a relatively short period of time.  
We developed a table of prioritization points in order to quantitatively relate these 
three factors and provide an overall “criticality score” for a specific resupply requirement. 
The entire table is provided in Appendix H. Assigning quantitative values to the 
replenishment of specific supplies for specific units allows us to utilize a linear 
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programming tool to optimize the allocation of distribution assets in order to best support 
the overall mission.  
b. Distribution Model Formulation  
 
Indices & Sets  
i ∈ I Class of supply (1, 3, 5, AO)  
j ∈ J Supported Unit (INF1, INF2, INF3, FA, CAV, ENG)  
 
Input Parameters  
   𝐶𝐶 Overall transportation Capacity of BSB (number of prime movers)  
   𝐶𝐶1 Bulk water distribution capacity 
   𝐶𝐶3 Bulk fuel distribution capacity 
   𝐶𝐶5 Platform space available for the transport of ammunition  
   𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  Platform space available for the transport of “All Other” supplies  
  
 Calculated Parameters  
   Eij Ending inventory of class i ∈ I at unit j ∈ J (measured in DOS) 
 Wij Conversion factor for number of vehicles per DOS, for i ∈ I, j ∈ J 
 
  Sij Shortage of class i ∈ I at unit j ∈ J (measured in trucks) 
  Pij Prioritization points for level of supply 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼, j ∈ J 
   
 Integer Decision Variables 
   Xij Number of trucks of supply i ∈ I shipped to unit j ∈ J 
 
 Objective Function 
   (1) Maximize ∑ ∑ XijPijj∈Ji∈I  
 
 Constraints  
   (2) ∑ ∑ Xijj∈Ji∈I ≤ 𝐶𝐶 (total shipping capacity) 
   (3) ∑ Xijj∈J ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼 (shipping capacity by class) 
   (4) Xij ≤ �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�,                            ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼, j ∈ 𝐽𝐽 (shipping limit) 
 (5) Xij ∈ {0,1,2,⋯ } ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼, j ∈ 𝐽𝐽 
  
(1) Explanation of Objective Function and Constraints  
Our objective function (1) prioritizes shipments based on the current level of 
supply, by class of supply and unit, seeking to maximize aggregate value. The model 
allocates transportation capacity subject to four main constraint types. Constraint (2) 
represents overall transportation capacity—the availability of 33 prime movers (28 LHS 
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vehicles and five HEMTT fuelers) to move all supplies. Constraint (3) ensures that the 
amount of water, fuel, ammunition, and “all other” supplies transported does not exceed 
the transportation capacity available to move these supplies. Constraint (4) ensures that no 
more than the amount of trucks required to meet demand may be shipped. Constraint (5) 
ensures that our decision variables are integers, since distribution assets cannot be divided, 
due to the specialized shipping requirements of each class of goods.  
(2) Adjusting Capacity to Reflect Variation in Equipment Readiness 
Realistically, not all equipment a unit has will be available for operational use. Both 
planned and unplanned maintenance will limit the number of vehicles available at a given 
time. We chose to assume that the average operational availability of Army vehicles was 
85%, with a floor of 70%. Using a triangular distribution in Crystal Ball to simulate the 
operational readiness of LHS and HEMTT fuelers results in adjusted capacity levels for 
both those assets each day. On any given day, there will be a minimum of 19 LHSs 
available, with an average of 23.8. Similarly, there will be between three and five, but most 
often four, HEMTT refuelers available for resupply operations each day.  
(3) Adjusting for Oversupply with Binary Demand Constraints 
Ideally, we would want to minimize risk by maximizing the prioritization points 
reflected in post-distribution supply inventories (next day “beginning inventory”) at each 
supported unit. However, our integer programming model is not ideally suited to account 
for these non-linear effects directly. Instead, the model uses pre-distribution inventories 
(current day “ending inventory”) in order to assess the urgency of need and allow the BSB 
to prioritize resupply efforts accordingly. As expected, the key limitation of this approach 
is that optimizing based on prioritization points determined by pre-distribution inventories 
encourages over-supply. For example, if the highest priority unit has zero days of the most 
urgently needed supply, the model would maximize prioritization points by sending all 
vehicles to that location. 
We refined our model to ensure that it does not errantly reward the extra unused 
capacity in the objective function. To adjust for this issue, we created a mirror set of 
decision variables and demand constraints, making the decision variables binary and the 
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demand constraints equal to the exact amount of supplies a unit requires. The binary 
decision variables activate when shipments exceed supply. The model then deducts the 
proportional value of prioritization points within our objective function. In order to remove 
the incentive for shipping an underutilized truck for a highly prioritized supply class and 
unit, we introduce a new set of parameters and binary decision variables: 
Binary Decision Variables 
  Yij = {1 if a truck is shipped to cover a partial truckload of demand, 0 otherwise} 
 
We can now reformulate our model as:  
 Objective Function 
   (6) Maximize ∑ ∑ �Xij − Yij��Sij� − Sij��Pijj∈Ji∈I  
 
 
 Constraints  
   (7) ∑ ∑ Xijj∈Ji∈I ≤ 𝐶𝐶 (total shipping capacity) 
   (8) ∑ Xijj∈J ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼 (shipping capacity by class) 
   (9) Xij ≤ �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�,                            ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼, j ∈ 𝐽𝐽 (shipping limit) 
   (10) Xij − Yij ≤ �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�,                 ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼, j ∈ 𝐽𝐽 (linking constraint) 
 (11) Xij ∈ {0,1,2,⋯ } ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼, j ∈ 𝐽𝐽 
 (12) Yij ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼, j ∈ 𝐽𝐽 
 
The updated objective (6) now caps the incentive to ship at the prorated amount of 
any partial shipment required to fully meet demand. For example, if a unit’s shortage was 
2,100 gallons of water, the BSB would not send more than two Class I platforms (carrying 
2,000 gallons of water each) to fulfill this need. Allocating any more resources would be a 
wasted use of capacity, no matter how great the initial urgency of the shortage. Whereas 
objective (1) awarded prioritization points for up to 4,000 gallons shipped, objective (6) 
now only awards prioritization points for the first 2,100 gallons shipped.  
In order to ensure the binary variables are activated when partial-truck demand 
utilizes full-trucks for shipments, constraints (10) act as a linking constraint, by rounding 
down the shortage amount measured in vehicles to less the actual shortage amount allowed 
in constraints (9). When the shortage is already an integer value, constraints (9) and (10) 
become redundant. 
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Constraints (7) to (9) and (11) remain the same as in the original model. The binary 
constraints are introduced in (12). 
(4) Simulation with ExLF 
Using this distribution model within our simulation allows us to optimize the 
distribution of transportation assets each day. Ultimately, our simulation generates the 
ending inventory of each category of supply at each supported unit over a 21-day period. 
This allows us to see how adjustments in transportation capacity affect the logistics 
response and timely resupply of each supported unit.  
Creating transportation capacity requires both equipment and personnel. Vehicles 
and their distribution assets require drivers to conduct resupply operations, and obviously 
drivers would be no use without vehicles to drive. Most units, including our simulated 
BSB, are manned with two drivers per vehicle. While vehicles can theoretically operate for 
24 hours per day, per most safety policies, all drivers must receive eight hours of rest during 
the same 24-hour day. Therefore, while 33 vehicles operating for 24 hours theoretically 
represents the maximum transportation capacity of the BSB, available drivers can only 
operate 33 vehicles for 16 hours per day.  
By allowing for unmanned follower vehicles, ExLF technology decreases the 
amount of personnel required to operate the BSB’s vehicles, thereby removing this 
personnel constraint present in the base case and allowing capacity to expand back towards 
the theoretical maximum of 33 vehicles operating 24 hours per day. Instead of expressing 
transportation capacity in terms of a longer operating day, an equivalent way to understand 
the expansion of transportation capacity with ExLF technology is 50% more vehicles 
operating for the same length operating day. Therefore, to capture the impact of ExLF in 
our second 21-day simulation, we increased the number of vehicle platforms (after 
adjusting for maintenance effects) by 50%. For example, if our simulation on a given day 
resulted in 24 available LHS vehicles (four down for maintenance), under ExLF we 
represented this expanded capacity by adjusting our constraint 50% higher to 36 HEMTT 
vehicles. This reflects the idea that 24 vehicles incorporating ExLF technology and 
enjoying greater personnel efficiency can achieve the same theoretical logistics throughput 
as 36 vehicles operating without ExLF technology.  
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
As previously stated, an IBCT’s logistics support system aims to ensure supported 
units constantly have between two and three days of supply on hand. Therefore, scenarios 
where classes of supply resulted in less than 2 DOS at the end of any given day represented 
an increased level of risk for that unit. These scenarios provide the basis through which the 
simulation results are compared and analyzed between two 21-day simulations; the status 
quo IBCT and an IBCT with ExLF-enabled transportation. All other variables were held 
constant in order to isolate the effect of ExLF implementation.  
A. RESULTS 
The first simulation, the status quo IBCT, resulted in a total of 37 occurrences 
where a unit’s level of supply dipped below the 2 DOS level threshold. The data table from 
the result of the simulation is provided in Table 5. 
Table 5. IBCT Status Quo 21-Day Simulation 
 
The second simulation, an IBCT with ExLF, resulted in a total of four occurrences 
where a unit’s level a supply fell below the 2 DOS level threshold. The data table from the 
result of the simulation is provided in Table 6. 
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Table 6. IBCT with ExLF 21-Day Simulation 
 
The figures within the table are rounded up to two decimal places. Therefore, the “2.00” for “INFANTRY 
3” on day 5 for class III is actually 1.999564, which just barely breaks the 2 DOS threshold. 
B. ANALYSIS 
As expected, our simulation incorporating ExLF technology demonstrated that 
increases in transportation capacity would result in improved logistics performance 
through more timely resupplies. Overall, Class III was the most strained of our categories 
under the base scenario and also showed the most improvement with the incorporation of 
ExLF. This result makes sense given that there were only five total platforms available for 
transporting fuel, making it the most “constrained” of our transportation assets for this 
specific category of supply. Also of note, the simulation with ExLF resulted in only four 
occasions where a supply category fell below 2 DOS, but each of these occasions were just 
barely below this threshold with a low of 1.975 and an average of 1.985 between all four 
occasions. Therefore, ExLF provided a nearly complete reduction in risk as measured as 
any occasion where a supply category falls below 2 DOS. 
1. The Impact of ExLF 
The status quo for throughput did not place a strain on the supply chain that could 
be considered catastrophic. While shortfalls well below 2 DOS were experienced, no 
battalion reached zero DOS in any class of supply. ExLF increases throughput capacity 
during combat operations, but not to a level that clearly demonstrates a need for adoption 
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of the technology—at least not in the context of this model. The primary consideration 
where ExLF could be leveraged given the results involves the personnel efficiencies gained 
from the technology. The ability to increase throughput capacity with fewer operators 
introduces the option of utilizing these saved personnel for alternative purposes. 
2. HEMTT Fueler Shortfall 
Under the status quo, HEMTT Fueler capacity was unable to meet the full demand 
of the IBCT for the entirety of the simulation. Even with the increased capacity gained 
from ExLF, fuel was still constrained for all days simulated. However, the fuel shortfall 
under ExLF was reduced by 15.7% across all six supported units. While fuel still remained 
constrained with ExLF, LHS capacity was not fully utilized and may provide an 
opportunity for the U.S. Army to evaluate the allocation of equipment and personnel assets 
with respect to Class III. Exchanging LHSs for fuelers and/or motor transport operators for 
petroleum supply specialists when developing the standard IBCT configuration may solve 
the identified fuel capacity shortfall.  
3. Limitations  
There are several limitations in our analysis related to assumptions made to simplify 
our scenario or made with respect to the application of ExLF technology in order to 
establish a functioning simulation model to conduct the comparison.  
First, we acknowledge that the nature of our scenario does not fully reflect the 
dynamic nature of combat operations, which can mask the size and nature of the 
transportation challenge for the Army. For example, we chose to assume steady-state 
operations ignoring troop movements and the resulting personnel lift requirements. These 
requirements can be substantial over the course of an operation and particularly during 
early stage insertion or major offensives. Similarly, our scenario focuses exclusively on 
one segment of the supply chain by assuming unlimited supplies at the BSB. This limitation 
masks strain that might be present throughout the supply chain due to both supply shortages 
and a lack of lift capacity. To the extent these bottlenecks are related to the lack of available 
drivers, ExLF has great potential to alleviate this strain with compounding benefits 
throughout the supply chain. On the other hand, to the extent where bottlenecks are a result 
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of shortages in transportation assets or actual supplies, ExLF would not produce much of 
an effect at all. A more robust analysis examining a multi-stage supply chain would better 
parse out the relationships between these bottlenecks and better capture aggregate impacts 
across the entire supply chain.  
Second, the design of our analysis only explores one application of the expanded 
transportation capacity provided by ExLF technology: increasing throughput in order to 
provide more frequent resupplies. It is also likely that ExLF would be implemented to 
decrease the personnel requirement, holding throughput constant, or to resupply units 
positioned at further distances from the BSB.  
Finally, our analysis implicitly assumes that the operational capability of unmanned 
follower vehicles is the same as manned vehicles. In reality, the ExLF convoys might not 
possess the same resilience or mobility as fully manned convoys, for example, in the case 
of adverse weather, rough terrain, navigational challenges, or the performance of complex 
driving maneuvers (reversing a vehicle with a trailer). Our analysis also does not account 
for any changes in maintenance patterns due to the implementation of this technology. Our 
simulation explored the impact of increasing transportation capacity and logistics 
throughput through personnel efficiency. In reality, incorporating ExLF technology will 
involve numerous, unknown second and third order effects that must also be considered to 
provide a more complete evaluation.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. BATTLEFIELD APPLICATION  
We chose to base our simulation at the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) in an effort 
to test ExLF outcomes in the most demanding environment. The Army has identified gaps, 
as we have previously discussed, in sustainment, and the effects of those gaps are more 
significantly felt the closer sustainment operations occur to the enemy. That said, our 
simulation is just an attempt at a proof of concept and is not a recommendation that the 
Army begin ExLF (or any AGR technology) adoption at the FLOT.  
The leaders that will make the decision for adoption of ExLF have extensive 
professional experience with manned convoy operations. The idea of removing the soldier 
from the equation may be unpalatable and flies directly in the face of the Army’s “boots 
on ground” mentality. The use of unmanned vehicles in other services (e.g., drones) will 
soften the perception that operations must be manned, but there will still be a hurdle. 
Adopting AGR technology in the rear echelons will likely ease potential tensions with the 
technology and allow programs like ExLF to prove themselves in a lower-threat 
environment.  
Any decision the Army makes on ExLF adoption will factor in many variables. We 
believe these variables must include considerations in maintenance, survivability, and 
personnel.  
B. MAINTENANCE IMPLICATIONS  
Adoption of ExLF will lead to ramifications, both negative and positive, with the 
maintenance requirements of any vehicle on which the system is applied.  
1. Negative Considerations  
Additional Maintenance Professionals: ExLF will incorporate technology that is 
unique to the Army and requires increased investment in maintenance, training, and 
equipment.  This investment must allow for additional allocations of computer/detection 
system repairers (Military Occupational Specialty 94F). The 94F community would handle 
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the maintenance of the robotic kits, while the 91B (wheeled vehicle mechanic) 
community is leveraged to support the increased maintenance intensity of driving the 
trucks for longer shifts.  There will be costs associated with increasing man-hours of 94Fs, 
and potentially also man-hours of the 91Bs, as these vehicles are expected to perform at a 
higher operational tempo.    
Supply Support:  ExLF will require maintenance and servicing of parts that are 
unique to the technology and would not otherwise be required on a standard vehicle.   
Additional Parts Storage:  Units will maintain a bench stock of parts for the new 
system.  Storage of these new parts will require additional containers or facility square 
footage as well as any holding costs that go along with that new storage.  This bench stock 
would otherwise not exist with the status quo.    
Increased Platform Downtime: Applying ExLF to a vehicle platform introduces one 
additional system that requires preventive and corrective maintenance. This may increase 
the overall downtime for whatever platform to which ExLF is applied. 
2. Positive Considerations  
Accident Avoidance:  Accidents involve many costs.  While vehicle damage is the 
most obvious, personnel also risk injury or death which carry costs as well (medical, 
administrative, lost productivity, etc.).  It is estimated that over 90% of vehicle accidents 
are caused by human error (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA], 
2015). Autonomous technology could theoretically recapture 90% of the costs associated 
with accidents by avoiding the accidents caused by human error. While accidents due to 
mechanical failure are also possible, driver-assist technology should greatly reduce damage 
in these instances by removing the chance of human error during a reaction to the failure.    
Diagnostic Technology:  There is the potential to integrate condition-based-
maintenance strategies with diagnostic and health monitoring capability. By providing 
component readiness and performance status of the host vehicle, this “Health Management 
System” (HMS) will enable fault detection and appropriate corrective actions. Monitoring 
vehicle status ensures that performance-based maintenance is scheduled promptly and 
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efficiently, resulting in the more efficient use of maintenance resources. Preventive 
maintenance is inherently cheaper and less intensive than corrective maintenance.  
C. SURVIVABILITY  
Any automation advancement comes with the hope that soldiers will experience 
fewer casualties. Fewer soldiers in a convoy will necessarily lead to fewer soldier casualties 
simply because of reduced enemy exposure for the total force. However, because ExLF is 
not a completely autonomous convoy solution, the personnel survivability effects must be 
viewed slightly differently.  
For the soldiers tasked with manning the lead vehicle in a leader-follower convoy, 
the chance of casualty will almost certainly increase (assuming no other convoy changes 
have been made). For example, a convoy of 10 vehicles without ExLF technology that is 
ambushed by the enemy will have at least 20 soldiers on hand for defense (one driver and 
one truck commander per vehicle). That same convoy with ExLF technology will have just 
two soldiers (one driver and one truck commander for the lead vehicle). Eighteen soldiers 
have been removed from risk because of ExLF; however, the two remaining soldiers are in 
significantly increased danger for injury or death at the individual level. Any commander 
will struggle to justify exposing soldiers to that level of personal risk.  
One solution may be to increase the size of the security element that is escorting 
the supply convoy, and that will certainly decrease the risk. However, commanders must 
consider what other missions become degraded or infeasible through this reallocation of 
combat assets.  
D. PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS   
ExLF technology clearly provides some tangible benefits but also comes with 
significant personnel considerations. In short, ExLF technology allows a unit the ability to 
do more with less, but this benefit comes at the expense of increased load and unload time 
required to get a logistics convoy prepared at the origin and off-loaded at the destination. 
The following example provides a basic illustration of this point.  
Take the previous scenario where ExLF is incorporated to its fullest extent for a 
convoy comprised of 10 vehicles in other words, one manned leader vehicle and nine 
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unmanned follower vehicles. Typically, such a convoy would require between 20 at the 
most minimal possibility up to near 40 personnel to operate. Meanwhile, ExLF would 
enable this same convoy to operate with as little as two personnel in the lead vehicle. Now, 
consider the fact that the personnel assigned to a convoy are also responsible for preparing, 
loading, and staging of the vehicles. This task moves quickly and efficiently when each 
vehicle’s operators work together to prepare it simultaneously along with the all the other 
vehicles of the convoy, but would present a significant challenge in the scenario where 
ExLF is implemented with the minimum number of personnel. Thus, the personnel savings 
from ExLF comes at the expense of much more effort to handle the convoy’s cargo. 
Therefore, how the saved personnel are utilized becomes a consideration of paramount 
importance to the overall picture of the benefits attained by ExLF.  
This scenario provided an illustration of two ways to conduct a 10-vehicle convoy 
with and without ExLF. The next section further explores alternative forms and levels of 
implementation of ExLF technology within logistics convoy operations and the effect on 
both transportation capacity and personnel.  
E. FORMS AND LEVELS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ExLF   
ExLF technology provides great flexibility in both the form and level of 
implementation to augment transportation capacity. This flexibility enables a unit to 
leverage which type of implementation of ExLF best suits their mission requirements and/
or constraints. The next section examines three alternatives of implementation and the 
resulting effect on capacity, while the fourth explores some options for utilizing the 
potential excess personnel created from ExLF implementation. 
1. Status Quo Capacity with Less Personnel and Equipment  
The first option involves the ability of ExLF to maintain current transportation 
capacity with less personnel and equipment. The amount of personnel and equipment 
reduction depends on the specific operational context of a given unit; the correct balance 
will vary from one unit to the next. The increase in utilization capacity for each operator 
and truck with ExLF enables this form of implementation. A reduction in the amount of 
equipment necessary to effectively provide logistics support also results in a reduction in 
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the maintenance requirement as well. However, as noted earlier, further research is 
necessary to determine the magnitude of this benefit due to the increased operational tempo 
of each individual truck. The bottom line for this form of implementation is that ExLF 
provides the ability to provide the same transportation capacity with less personnel and less 
equipment.  
2. Small Capacity Increase with Less Personnel 
The second option involves the ability of ExLF to increase current transportation 
capacity with less personnel but with the status quo equipment. Again, in similar fashion 
to the previous section, the amount of personnel reduction depends on the specific 
operational context of a given unit. By leveraging the greater efficiency of each operator 
and the increased utilization of each truck, a unit can experience an increased logistics 
transportation capacity while simultaneously considering the available options for 
alternative uses of the displaced personnel. The bottom line for this form of implementation 
is that a unit can increase its capacity using their status quo equipment set and 
simultaneously leverage the personnel savings for other purposes.  
3. Large Capacity Increase with More Equipment 
The third option involves the ability of ExLF to greatly increase current 
transportation capacity with status quo personnel and more equipment. The magnitude of 
equipment increase depends on the specific operational context of a given unit; in some 
cases, large increases in capacity is unnecessary. This form of implementation leverages 
the ability of a unit to maximize the capacity of each individual truck operator but requires 
a substantial investment in additional trucks. A primary consideration of this form of 
implementation manifests with budget constraints and maintenance. Increasing the number 
of trucks in a unit is no simple task and will present a significant obstacle, particularly in a 
likely future of fiscal austerity in response to the growing national debt. Furthermore, an 
increase in the number of trucks also requires a complimentary increase in the maintenance 
activity required to support those trucks, resulting in an increase of 91B soldiers, which 
manifests an additional expense to consider. Yet, due to ExLF’s autonomous capability, 
the Army would not have to enlist and train additional truck operators, providing a slight 
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counterbalance to these identified expenses. The bottom line for this form of 
implementation is that it provides the opportunity for the Army to bridge any of the 
transportation capacity gaps determined worth the increased expense.  
4. Alternative Options for Displaced Personnel 
One of the greatest benefits of ExLF involves the personnel savings achieved while 
maintaining or even increasing transportation capacity. Personnel represents one of the 
most significant investments for the United States military. The amount of time and money 
required to recruit, train, and maintain a soldier is significant, and it imposes a challenge 
for the Army to allocate enough trained personnel everywhere in need. Therefore, 
considering options where the saved personnel provide the best utility is a necessary 
discussion.  
Maintainers: Regardless of the chosen form of ExLF implementation, the increased 
operational tempo of each truck will require more frequent preventive maintenance. 
Therefore, utilizing some of the displaced personnel to augment the maintenance capacity 
of a unit provides a logical solution. Cross-training truck operators as mechanics would 
provide the ability to reallocate personnel if deemed necessary at a latter point, or the unit 
could be restructured to have fewer truck operators and more mechanics. 
Heavy Equipment Operators: Reducing the number of personnel assigned to 
logistics convoys through the implementation of ExLF creates an increased burden on the 
task of loading and unloading supply cargo. Therefore, utilizing some of the displaced 
personnel as heavy equipment (HE) operators7 provides a solution to this burden. These 
soldiers could either be cross-trained for operating both trucks and forklift assets or, 
eventually, units could be restructured with fewer truck operators and more fully trained 
HE operators.  
Combat focused: Another area of potential concern regarding the implementation 
of ExLF involves the survivability of a convoy with reduced personnel. Therefore, 
restructuring units with fewer truck operators and more combat-oriented occupation 
 
7 Heavy equipment includes a variety of specialized assets, but those of interest here include various 
forklift assets used to load and off-load cargo from trucks. 
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specialties would provide the ability to increase the survivability of an ExLF convoy. Total 
personnel savings on convoy operations would necessarily be reduced in this case, but the 
inclusion of combat-oriented occupation specialties on convoys would also likely improve 
the survivability of the convoy above the status quo construct with only truck operators. 
So, this option provides a commander with a logical solution if ExLF is implemented near 
the FLOT in contested areas.  
Needs of the Army: Limitations on the number of personnel, or force caps, creates 
a situation where the supply of some occupational specialties falls well short of the demand. 
Therefore, utilizing the sum of displaced personnel force cap spaces for the recruitment 
and training of additional occupational specialty areas in high demand could help the Army 
adjust to personnel shortfalls throughout the force. If ExLF is eventually adopted 
throughout the entire Army, the number of truck operators displaced would create a 
significant opportunity for the Army to implement a combination of the above-mentioned 
options, maximizing the utility gained from the AGR technology.  
F. MARINE CORPS ExLF APPLICATION   
The Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) is the Marine Corps’ 
comparable variant of Army’s PLS. The LVSR provides similar capabilities as the PLS 
and utilizes the same M1076 trailer. Therefore, the ExLF appliqué would easily adapt to 
the LVSR should the Marine Corps choose to pursue acquisition of this AGR technology. 
However, in its current state, ExLF may not provide the same tangible benefits for the 
Marine Corps as the Army.  
The Marine Corps and Army share similarities in terms of equipment and 
capabilities as ground forces, but their differences have significant implications for the 
application of ExLF to Marine transportation equipment. The Marine Corps intentionally 
represents a much smaller and more agile force in comparison to the Army due to the 
mission designated by Title 10 requirements. The Army is well designed and equipped for 
dominance in prolonged land-based warfare with robust and lengthy supply lines. In 
contrast, the Marine Corps is specifically tailored and equipped for expeditionary 
amphibious operations and self-sustainment for short periods up to one month, depending 
on the size of the force. Keeping these differences in mind, the potential role of ExLF 
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within the Marine Corps will likely look very different from the Army and may not actually 
materialize until AGR technology matures.  
Marine Corps’ missions include raids, assaults, and crisis response operations 
within the littoral regions of the world. These missions typically result in compressed 
supply lines much closer to and often within kinetic combat operations, corresponding to 
a scenario currently more suitable for human operators. The more chaotic an environment, 
the more the necessity for immediate decisive individual actions becomes for the forces 
operating within that environment. Therefore, ExLF technology as it exists today most 
likely cannot provide the same paradigm-shifting impact to logistics support for the Marine 
Corps’ amphibious operations that the Army may experience.  
Another important consideration regarding the potential implementation of ExLF 
concerns the nature of amphibious operations. Marine missions often originate from 
amphibious ships and utilize ship-to-shore connectors8 to get ashore. These connectors 
require the Marines and vehicles to quickly disembark from the connector upon arriving 
ashore to limit risk exposure to the forces. This significant requirement further complicates 
any full-scale integration of ExLF into Marine operations.  
One potential solution for ExLF includes a much smaller ratio between leader and 
follower vehicles utilized within Marine logistics convoys. A logistics convoy with 
multiple leader vehicles, each with minimal follower vehicles, may provide a sufficient 
ability for the convoy to conduct defensive maneuvers while still providing some of the 
aforementioned personnel benefits regarding increasing efficiency. Furthermore, by 
limiting the number of unmanned ExLF vehicles, the amphibious issue previously 
identified could be partially mitigated. 
The expeditionary and amphibious nature of Marine operations lends itself more 
favorably to the air and sea autonomous vehicle technology currently being pursued by the 
U.S. Navy. These platforms are specifically adapted for the areas and terrain where the 
Marine Corps is designed to operate. Consequently, most of the current investment in 
 
8 Primary ship-to-shore connectors includes the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and the Landing 
Craft Utility (LCU) vehicles. More information can be found on these vehicles at 
https://www.candp.marines.mil/Programs/Focus-Area-3-Naval-Integration/Surface-Connectors/ 
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autonomous resupply technology for the Marine Corps does not focus on AGR capabilities 
such as ExLF.  
Despite these considerations, as ExLF technology matures and future versions that 
provide enhanced capabilities come online, the Marine Corps must reevaluate the potential 
application of this technology to augment its logistics capacity. In the meantime, the 
Marine Corps should continue to closely monitor the Army’s utilization and refinement of 
their integration of ExLF. The potential benefits of the AGR technology represent a 
worthwhile capability too promising to dismiss.  
G. FUTURE RESEARCH   
This project represents a stepping-stone for a multitude of future research 
possibilities. In order to develop a baseline model for comparison, much of our effort 
focused on the development of a functioning model to mirror the organic logistics support 
system of an IBCT. Our model is limited by design but could be easily expanded to support 
additional research. Some recommended expansions and adjustments include: 
1. Enemy Action Incorporation 
Our simulation did not consider the possibility of enemy actions taken against a 
resupply convoy. Future iterations of this research could include a chance that a convoy 
does not reach the supported unit due to enemy interference. Such consideration would 
further strain the status quo transportation capacity and increase the benefit of 
implementing ExLF into logistics support operations. 
2. Personnel Survivability Considerations 
The survivability of convoys utilizing ExLF to the fullest extent introduces two 
elements of personnel survivability. First, fewer personnel in a convoy reduces the 
probability of a soldier getting harmed during an enemy ambush and/or an Improvised 
Explosion Device (IED) detonation. Second, this same convoy with reduced personnel are 
now exposed to substantially more individual risk than in the status quo scenario of a fully 
manned convoy. Therefore, incorporating this variable into ExLF simulation may provide 
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the ability to explore the optimal number of personnel that balances both components of 
personnel survivability. 
3. Mechanical Failure Considerations 
ExLF may actually induce an increase in the number of maintenance failures 
experienced by the vehicle platform utilized. This decrease in truck availability was not 
included in our model, but incorporating this variable would more accurately highlight the 
maintenance considerations of an increased operational tempo for the equipment. 
4. Simulation Scope 
This simulation is centered on one small portion of the overall theater sustainment 
operating picture. Expanding the simulation to include resupply convoys, which occur in 
rear echelons, will help to increase the scope of research. These rear echelon convoys also 
represent logistics operations done by unit types other than an IBCT and may highlight 
Army manning and equipping concerns that were not uncovered in our research. Further 
benefits of ExLF may be realized in a broader application. 
5. Prioritization Points Significance 
Adjusting prioritization points on a class of supply basis as determined by the 
mission of the unit will create different results in the distribution plan of the model. Units 
could be prioritized based on the relative importance of that class of supply given its unique 
equipment set and/or mission. For example, an Engineer Battalion utilizes much more 
Class III than any other unit within an IBCT, due in large part to the fuel consumption of 
the HE equipment they operate. Therefore, Class III may be a higher priority for them than 
any other unit. A similar relationship could be argued for Class V for the Field Artillery 
Battalion in comparison to other units of an IBCT. Incorporating this prioritization points 
adjustment would provide more realism to the model. 
6. Organic Lift Gap 
We chose to keep the IBCT in a static location for our simulation. Future iterations 
could strain the capacity of the IBCT further if the variable of units changing their location 
is integrated. The IBCT would be required to move a large quantity of supplies that are 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 45 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
otherwise static in our model (e.g., personnel, tents, generators, etc.). Incorporating this 
variable introduces an additional level of realism to the model. 
7. Other AGR Systems 
This model can be adapted to simulate the difference between the status quo and 
any AGR technology. The model does not need to be limited to studying only ExLF. With 
the growing interest in AGR throughout the DoD, adjusting this model to fit alternative 
technology to measure against the status quo may provide many opportunities for further 
research. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The model developed in this research serves as an important launching point for 
additional research. While the conclusions and analysis we have provided are valuable, 
future research has the potential for leaps in understanding that the limited nature of our 
work has not achieved. AGR technology shows promise for the future of logistics support 
operations and will likely provide numerous additional research opportunities as this 
capability matures. 
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APPENDIX A. INFANTRY 1—SIMULATED CONSUMPTION 
 
DAY Class I Class III Class V All Other
1 1,944.79 1,344.58 0.00 14.82
2 1,828.35 1,583.89 0.00 18.59
3 1,900.70 1,412.50 0.00 16.09
4 1,536.07 1,594.02 0.00 14.95
5 2,136.93 1,470.51 0.00 18.61
6 2,317.15 1,493.25 0.00 15.12
7 1,928.15 1,553.94 0.00 19.46
8 2,174.76 1,721.39 0.00 17.65
9 2,055.17 1,523.75 0.00 15.09
10 1,918.61 1,542.58 0.00 18.87
11 2,183.99 1,343.27 0.00 17.36
12 1,921.05 1,702.88 0.00 15.71
13 1,658.62 1,337.06 0.00 15.21
14 2,036.94 1,509.10 0.00 17.87
15 1,764.32 1,478.07 0.00 16.69
16 1,747.14 1,555.40 0.00 15.72
17 1,765.35 1,408.23 0.00 18.51
18 1,990.74 1,467.37 0.00 17.45
19 1,763.52 1,291.23 0.00 19.04
20 2,144.62 1,608.07 0.00 17.62
21 1,868.76 1,481.71 0.00 18.35
Class I Class III Class V All Other
Average 1959.93 1486.00 145.00 17.00
DAY Class I Class III Class V All Other
1 0.99 0.90 0.00 0.87
2 0.93 1.07 0.00 1.09
3 0.97 0.95 0.00 0.95
4 0.78 1.07 0.00 0.88
5 1.09 0.99 0.00 1.09
6 1.18 1.00 0.00 0.89
7 0.98 1.05 0.00 1.14
8 1.11 1.16 0.00 1.04
9 1.05 1.03 0.00 0.89
10 0.98 1.04 0.00 1.11
11 1.11 0.90 0.00 1.02
12 0.98 1.15 0.00 0.92
13 0.85 0.90 0.00 0.89
14 1.04 1.02 0.00 1.05
15 0.90 0.99 0.00 0.98
16 0.89 1.05 0.00 0.92
17 0.90 0.95 0.00 1.09
18 1.02 0.99 0.00 1.03
19 0.90 0.87 0.00 1.12
20 1.09 1.08 0.00 1.04
21 0.95 1.00 0.00 1.08
SIMULATED CONSUMPTION IN DOS
AVERAGE CONSUMPTION FOR ONE DAY
CRYSTAL BALL SIMULATED CONSUMPTION
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APPENDIX B. INFANTRY 2—SIMULATED CONSUMPTION 
 
DAY Class I Class III Class V All Other
1 2,169.75 1,686.37 0.00 17.36
2 1,948.98 1,623.60 0.00 15.71
3 2,103.60 1,321.25 0.00 15.21
4 2,132.29 1,557.23 0.00 15.24
5 1,893.71 1,633.74 0.00 14.98
6 1,771.64 1,503.21 0.00 14.93
7 1,911.91 1,525.91 0.00 19.19
8 1,672.69 1,657.06 0.00 17.06
9 1,778.06 1,690.44 0.00 17.31
10 1,663.21 1,627.95 0.00 18.50
11 2,168.31 1,582.33 0.00 18.41
12 1,679.95 1,392.79 0.00 16.90
13 1,929.39 1,322.89 0.00 16.73
14 2,024.07 1,658.56 0.00 17.99
15 2,197.76 1,551.61 0.00 17.33
16 1,871.80 1,758.05 0.00 17.70
17 2,296.58 1,596.77 0.00 19.03
18 1,867.07 1,621.91 0.00 16.51
19 1,768.59 1,603.72 0.00 16.25
20 1,902.01 1,773.37 0.00 17.33
21 1,974.04 1,458.35 0.00 18.27
Class I Class III Class V All Other
Average 1959.93 1486.00 145.00 17.00
DAY Class I Class III Class V All Other
1 1.11 1.13 0.00 1.02
2 0.99 1.09 0.00 0.92
3 1.07 0.89 0.00 0.89
4 1.09 1.05 0.00 0.90
5 0.97 1.10 0.00 0.88
6 0.90 1.01 0.00 0.88
7 0.98 1.03 0.00 1.13
8 0.85 1.12 0.00 1.00
9 0.91 1.14 0.00 1.02
10 0.85 1.10 0.00 1.09
11 1.11 1.06 0.00 1.08
12 0.86 0.94 0.00 0.99
13 0.98 0.89 0.00 0.98
14 1.03 1.12 0.00 1.06
15 1.12 1.04 0.00 1.02
16 0.96 1.18 0.00 1.04
17 1.17 1.07 0.00 1.12
18 0.95 1.09 0.00 0.97
19 0.90 1.08 0.00 0.96
20 0.97 1.19 0.00 1.02
21 1.01 0.98 0.00 1.07
AVERAGE CONSUMPTION FOR ONE DAY
CRYSTAL BALL SIMULATED CONSUMPTION
SIMULATED CONSUMPTION IN DOS
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APPENDIX C. INFANTRY 3—SIMULATED CONSUMPTION 
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APPENDIX D. FIELD ARTILLERY—SIMULATED CONSUMPTION 
 
DAY Class I Class III Class V All Other
1 2,418.11 3,222.16 22,487.32 16.10
2 2,185.26 3,405.14 22,519.19 16.31
3 2,507.04 2,985.01 22,500.85 16.73
4 2,496.80 3,069.81 22,558.92 15.10
5 2,222.28 3,385.19 22,498.04 17.31
6 2,617.74 3,053.35 22,521.33 16.16
7 2,603.72 3,426.25 22,487.84 17.67
8 2,371.45 2,871.10 22,508.60 14.59
9 2,466.33 3,192.25 22,509.33 14.60
10 2,309.67 3,180.74 22,485.31 16.65
11 2,180.69 3,427.22 22,533.20 18.35
12 1,849.27 3,047.87 22,530.05 18.33
13 2,522.11 3,257.62 22,478.23 17.68
14 2,189.52 2,867.41 22,499.14 19.01
15 2,202.99 2,952.18 22,521.26 17.73
16 1,823.52 3,163.60 22,506.81 18.86
17 2,332.77 3,474.57 22,508.78 17.88
18 2,494.58 3,544.33 22,533.69 18.61
19 2,534.44 3,309.92 22,493.47 19.00
20 2,594.10 3,453.12 22,554.07 17.09
21 2,131.44 3,324.68 22,518.02 18.94
Class I Class III Class V All Other
Average 2374.12 3126.00 22509.00 17.00
DAY Class I Class III Class V All Other
1 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.95
2 0.92 1.09 1.00 0.96
3 1.06 0.95 1.00 0.98
4 1.05 0.98 1.00 0.89
5 0.94 1.08 1.00 1.02
6 1.10 0.98 1.00 0.95
7 1.10 1.10 1.00 1.04
8 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.86
9 1.04 1.02 1.00 0.86
10 0.97 1.02 1.00 0.98
11 0.92 1.10 1.00 1.08
12 0.78 0.98 1.00 1.08
13 1.06 1.04 1.00 1.04
14 0.92 0.92 1.00 1.12
15 0.93 0.94 1.00 1.04
16 0.77 1.01 1.00 1.11
17 0.98 1.11 1.00 1.05
18 1.05 1.13 1.00 1.09
19 1.07 1.06 1.00 1.12
20 1.09 1.10 1.00 1.01
21 0.90 1.06 1.00 1.11
SIMULATED CONSUMPTION IN DOS
CRYSTAL BALL SIMULATED CONSUMPTION
AVERAGE CONSUMPTION FOR ONE DAY
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APPENDIX E. CAVALRY—SIMULATED CONSUMPTION 
 
DAY Class I Class III Class V All Other
1 1,412.40 1,802.56 0.00 13.95
2 1,531.87 2,630.16 0.00 13.56
3 1,264.64 2,411.25 0.00 15.37
4 1,366.94 2,358.02 0.00 15.07
5 1,525.05 2,041.22 0.00 17.64
6 1,551.21 1,948.62 0.00 11.07
7 1,240.92 2,874.97 0.00 13.22
8 1,357.85 2,354.37 0.00 11.09
9 1,750.61 2,010.36 0.00 11.26
10 1,392.40 1,338.53 0.00 13.20
11 1,672.28 2,049.19 0.00 12.57
12 1,269.02 2,447.40 0.00 12.43
13 1,731.41 2,170.48 0.00 12.71
14 1,292.84 2,431.92 0.00 11.82
15 1,586.08 1,132.00 0.00 11.83
16 1,391.29 1,865.50 0.00 13.07
17 1,638.79 1,479.07 0.00 12.62
18 1,507.41 2,168.39 0.00 11.93
19 1,553.77 2,805.40 0.00 11.29
20 1,493.27 2,119.80 0.00 13.43
21 1,595.09 2,204.23 0.00 12.41
Class I Class III Class V All Other
Average 1464.61 1833.00 80.00 14.00
DAY Class I Class III Class V All Other
1 0.96 0.98 0.00 1.00
2 1.05 1.43 0.00 0.97
3 0.86 1.32 0.00 1.10
4 0.93 1.29 0.00 1.08
5 1.04 1.11 0.00 1.26
6 1.06 1.06 0.00 0.79
7 0.85 1.57 0.00 0.94
8 0.93 1.28 0.00 0.79
9 1.20 1.10 0.00 0.80
10 0.95 0.73 0.00 0.94
11 1.14 1.12 0.00 0.90
12 0.87 1.34 0.00 0.89
13 1.18 1.18 0.00 0.91
14 0.88 1.33 0.00 0.84
15 1.08 0.62 0.00 0.85
16 0.95 1.02 0.00 0.93
17 1.12 0.81 0.00 0.90
18 1.03 1.18 0.00 0.85
19 1.06 1.53 0.00 0.81
20 1.02 1.16 0.00 0.96
21 1.09 1.20 0.00 0.89
SIMULATED CONSUMPTION IN DOS
AVERAGE CONSUMPTION FOR ONE DAY
CRYSTAL BALL SIMULATED CONSUMPTION
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APPENDIX F. ENGINEER—SIMULATED CONSUMPTION 
 
DAY Class I Class III Class V All Other
1 2,142.70 5,380.72 0.00 19.45
2 1,821.69 5,487.94 0.00 22.72
3 2,352.58 5,214.76 0.00 18.88
4 1,918.67 4,965.25 0.00 16.53
5 2,369.08 4,879.97 0.00 19.74
6 2,623.29 4,904.63 0.00 21.59
7 2,372.00 5,225.48 0.00 22.64
8 2,125.72 5,220.00 0.00 19.56
9 2,241.74 5,424.40 0.00 19.61
10 2,269.65 5,198.67 0.00 17.08
11 2,219.68 4,954.53 0.00 15.43
12 2,208.65 5,153.01 0.00 15.94
13 2,144.20 4,882.51 0.00 14.99
14 2,156.05 5,352.81 0.00 14.62
15 2,164.28 4,916.02 0.00 15.23
16 2,739.65 5,201.94 0.00 16.10
17 2,322.42 5,141.92 0.00 14.78
18 2,437.15 5,379.09 0.00 15.96
19 2,087.76 5,084.30 0.00 15.00
20 2,255.12 5,158.87 0.00 15.18
21 2,027.00 5,003.17 0.00 14.93
Class I Class III Class V All Other
Average 2275.91 5156.00 68.00 20.00
DAY Class I Class III Class V All Other
1 0.94 1.04 0.00 0.97
2 0.80 1.06 0.00 1.14
3 1.03 1.01 0.00 0.94
4 0.84 0.96 0.00 0.83
5 1.04 0.95 0.00 0.99
6 1.15 0.95 0.00 1.08
7 1.04 1.01 0.00 1.13
8 0.93 1.01 0.00 0.98
9 0.98 1.05 0.00 0.98
10 1.00 1.01 0.00 0.85
11 0.98 0.96 0.00 0.77
12 0.97 1.00 0.00 0.80
13 0.94 0.95 0.00 0.75
14 0.95 1.04 0.00 0.73
15 0.95 0.95 0.00 0.76
16 1.20 1.01 0.00 0.80
17 1.02 1.00 0.00 0.74
18 1.07 1.04 0.00 0.80
19 0.92 0.99 0.00 0.75
20 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.76
21 0.89 0.97 0.00 0.75
SIMULATED CONSUMPTION IN DOS
AVERAGE CONSUMPTION FOR ONE DAY
CRYSTAL BALL SIMULATED CONSUMPTION
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APPENDIX G. SIMULATED TRUCK AVAILABILITY 
 
  
DAY LHS (28) Fuel (5) LHS Fuel
1 22.99 3.75 22.00 3.00
2 23.25 3.87 23.00 3.00
3 22.75 4.15 22.00 4.00
4 22.88 3.89 22.00 3.00
5 22.95 3.85 22.00 3.00
6 24.47 3.90 24.00 3.00
7 21.27 4.39 21.00 4.00
8 23.42 4.22 23.00 4.00
9 22.08 4.25 22.00 4.00
10 23.45 3.72 23.00 3.00
11 22.29 4.30 22.00 4.00
12 22.71 3.96 22.00 3.00
13 22.87 4.32 22.00 4.00
14 23.20 4.45 23.00 4.00
15 23.78 4.01 23.00 4.00
16 19.93 4.41 19.00 4.00
17 21.51 3.89 21.00 3.00
18 24.31 3.78 24.00 3.00
19 22.26 4.00 22.00 3.00
20 23.63 4.05 23.00 4.00
21 23.32 3.96 23.00 3.00
TRUCKS AVAILABLE ROUNDED DOWN
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APPENDIX H. PRIORITIZATION POINTS TABLE 
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